Saul Smilansky

 ( 21st-century Israeli Philosophers ) 

Saul Smilansky (; born 1961) is an Israeli philosopher and a Professor at the Department of Philosophy of the University of Haifa. He is known for his works on free will and applied ethics.

In normative and applied ethics, Smilansky has written extensively on moral paradoxes and related issues in what he terms "paradoxical ethics," where propositions may appear both plausible and absurd. His work addresses moral theory, justice, the role of self-deception and illusion in human life, population ethics, punishment, moral complaint and hypocrisy, gratitude, and contribution.

In the free will debate, Smilansky has developed two major lines of argument. First, he has defended a pluralistic approach to the compatibility question, which acknowledges both compatibilism and hard determinism (or other forms of free will skepticism) as partially valid, and seeks to integrate them. Second, he has advanced the position of Illusionism, according to which illusion plays a central and in many respects positive role in the free will problem.

Smilansky is the author of Free Will and Illusion (Oxford University Press, 2000), 10 Moral Paradoxes (Blackwell, 2007), which has been translated into seven languages, and Paradoxical Ethics (Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2026). He has also published more than one hundred papers in leading philosophical journals and edited collections.

Smilansky received his B.A. in philosophy from Tel Aviv University (1983) and his D.Phil. from Magdalen College, Oxford (1992).

• 10 Moral Paradoxes, Wiley-Blackwell. 2007.
• Free Will and Illusion, Oxford University Press. 2000.
• Paradoxical Ethics (Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2026)

• Smilansky, Saul. “The Ethical Advantages of Hard Determinism.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54, no. 2 (1994): 355–363. Smilansky, Saul. “The Ethical Advantages of Hard Determinism.” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 54, no. 2 (1994): 355–363.
• Smilansky, Saul. “Is There a Moral Obligation to Have Children?” Journal of Applied Philosophy 12, no. 1 (1995): 41–53. Smilansky, Saul. “Is There a Moral Obligation to Have Children?” *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 12, no. 1 (1995): 41–53.
• Smilansky, Saul. “Free Will.” Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2 (1999): 143–152. Bowling Green, OH: Philosophy Documentation Center. Smilansky, Saul. “Free Will.” *Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy* 2 (1999): 143–152.
• Smilansky, Saul. “Free Will, Fundamental Dualism, and the Centrality of Illusion.” In The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, edited by Robert Kane, 489–505. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. Smilansky, Saul. “Free Will, Fundamental Dualism, and the Centrality of Illusion.” In *The Oxford Handbook of Free Will*, ed. Robert Kane. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
• Smilansky, Saul. “Can Deontologists Be Moderate?” Philosophia 31, no. 1–2 (2003): 9–29. Smilansky, Saul. “Can Deontologists Be Moderate?” *Philosophia* 31, no. 1–2 (2003): 9–29.
• Smilansky, Saul. “Comments on Walter Ott’s ‘What Can Causal Claims Mean?’” Philosophia (2009). Smilansky, Saul. “Comments on Walter Ott’s ‘What Can Causal Claims Mean?’” *Philosophia* (2009).
• Smilansky, Saul. “Hard Determinism and Punishment.” Philosophical Studies 152, no. 3 (2011): 433–447. Smilansky, Saul. “Hard Determinism and Punishment.” *Philosophical Studies* 152, no. 3 (2011): 433–447.
• Smilansky, Saul. “Morally, Should We Prefer Never to Have Existed?” Journal of Value Inquiry 47, no. 2 (2013): 217–225. DOI:10.1007/s10790-013-9389-0. Smilansky, Saul. “Morally, Should We Prefer Never to Have Existed?” *Journal of Value Inquiry* 47, no. 2 (2013): 217–225. DOI:10.1007/s10790-013-9389-0.
• Smilansky, Saul. “A Hostage Situation.” Journal of Philosophy 116, no. 8 (2019): 447–466. Smilansky, Saul. “A Hostage Situation.” *Journal of Philosophy* 116, no. 8 (2019): 447–466.
• Smilansky, Saul. “Free Will Denial and Deontological Constraints.” In Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society, edited by Elizabeth Shaw, Derk Pereboom, and Gregg D. Caruso, 79–96. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019. Smilansky, Saul. “Free Will Denial and Deontological Constraints.” In Elizabeth Shaw, Derk Pereboom, and Gregg D. Caruso (eds.), *Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society*, 79–96. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019.
• Smilansky, Saul; Juha Räikkä. “Black Magic and Respecting Persons — Some Perplexities.” Ratio 33, no. 2 (2020): 173–183. Smilansky, Saul, and Juha Räikkä. “Black Magic and Respecting Persons — Some Perplexities.” *Ratio* 33, no. 2 (2020): 173–183.
• Smilansky, Saul. “Should We Sacrifice the Utilitarians First?” Philosophical Quarterly 70, no. 281 (2020): 850–867. Smilansky, Saul. “Should We Sacrifice the Utilitarians First?” *Philosophical Quarterly* 70, no. 281 (2020): 850–867.
• Smilansky, Saul. “The Moral Evaluation of Past Tragedies: A New Puzzle.” Journal of Moral Philosophy 17, no. 2 (2020): 188–201. Smilansky, Saul. “The Moral Evaluation of Past Tragedies: A New Puzzle.” *Journal of Moral Philosophy* 17, no. 2 (2020): 188–201.
• Smilansky, Saul. “We Are All in This Life Together.” Iyyun 68 (2020): 85–93. Smilansky, Saul. “We Are All in This Life Together.” *Iyyun* 68 (2020): 85–93.
• Smilansky, Saul. “A Puzzle About Self-Sacrificing Altruism.” Journal of Controversial Ideas 1, no. 1 (2021): Article 7. DOI:10.35995/jci01010007. Smilansky, Saul. “A Puzzle About Self-Sacrificing Altruism.” *Journal of Controversial Ideas* 1, no. 1 (2021): Article 7. DOI:10.35995/jci01010007.
• Smilansky, Saul. “Contribution, Replaceability and the Meaning of Our Lives.” Theoria 87, no. 2 (2021): 193–213. DOI:10.1111/theo.12352. Smilansky, Saul. “Contribution, Replaceability and the Meaning of Our Lives.” *Theoria* 87, no. 2 (2021): 193–213. DOI:10.1111/theo.12352.
• Smilansky, Saul. “Do You Have to Reply to This Paper?” Philosophia 49, no. 5 (2021): 1361–1368. Smilansky, Saul. “Do You Have to Reply to This Paper?” *Philosophia* 49, no. 5 (2021): 1361–1368.
• Smilansky, Saul. “Overpunishment and the Punishment of the Innocent.” Analytic Philosophy 62, no. 4 (2021): 463–475. DOI:10.1111/phib.12206. Smilansky, Saul. “Overpunishment and the Punishment of the Innocent.” *Analytic Philosophy* 62, no. 4 (2021): 463–475. DOI:10.1111/phib.12206.
• Smilansky, Saul. “The Idea of Moral Duties to History.” Philosophy 96, no. 1 (2021): 155–179. Smilansky, Saul. “The Idea of Moral Duties to History.” *Philosophy* 96, no. 1 (2021): 155–179.
• Smilansky, Saul. “Three Kinds of Failure.” Iyyun 69 (2021): 299–313. Smilansky, Saul. “Three Kinds of Failure.” *Iyyun* 69 (2021): 299–313.
• Smilansky, Saul. “Two Concepts of Effort.” Philosophia 50, no. 5 (2022): 2663–2673. DOI:10.1007/s11406-022-00494-z. Smilansky, Saul. “Two Concepts of Effort.” *Philosophia* 50, no. 5 (2022): 2663–2673. DOI:10.1007/s11406-022-00494-z.
• Smilansky, Saul. “The Moral Duty Not to Confirm Negative Stereotypes.” Journal of Moral Philosophy 21, no. 3–4 (2023): 379–403. DOI:10.1163/17455243-20234065. Smilansky, Saul. “The Moral Duty Not to Confirm Negative Stereotypes.” *Journal of Moral Philosophy* 21, no. 3–4 (2023): 379–403. DOI:10.1163/17455243-20234065.
• Smilansky, Saul. “Free Will Denialism as a Dangerous Gamble.” Diametros 21, no. 79 (2024): 119–131. DOI:10.33392/diam.1943. Smilansky, Saul. “Free Will Denialism as a Dangerous Gamble.” *Diametros* 21, no. 79 (2024): 119–131. DOI:10.33392/diam.1943.

• Personal website